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Diffstat (limited to 'ipsec-tools/src/racoon/TODO')
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diff --git a/ipsec-tools/src/racoon/TODO b/ipsec-tools/src/racoon/TODO new file mode 100644 index 00000000..1507167e --- /dev/null +++ b/ipsec-tools/src/racoon/TODO @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +$KAME: TODO,v 1.36 2001/09/19 09:41:39 sakane Exp $ + +Please send any questions or bug reports to snap-users@kame.net. + +TODO list + +URGENT +o The documents for users convenience. +o split log file based on client. printf-like config directive, i.e. + "logfile racoon.%s.log", should be useful here. + -> beware of possible security issue, don't use sprintf() directly! + make validation before giving a string to sprintf(). +o save decrypted IKE packet in tcpdump format +o IPComp SA with wellknown CPI in CPI field. how to handle it? +o better rekey + +MUST +o multiple certificate payload handling. +o To consider the use with certificate infrastructure. PXIX ??? +o kmstat should be improved. +o Informational Exchange processing properly. +o require less configuration. phase 2 is easier (as kernel presents racoon + some hints), phase 1 is harder. for example, + - grab phase 2 lifetime and algorith configuration from sadb_comb payloads in + ACQUIRE message. + - give reasonable default behavior when no configuration file is present. + - difficult items: + how to guess a reasonable phase 1 SA lifetime + (hardcoded default? guess from phase 2 lifetime?) + guess what kind of ID payload to use + guess what kind of authentication to be used + guess phase 1 DH group (for aggressive mode, we cannot negotiate it) + guess if we need phase 2 PFS or not (we cannot negotiate it. so + we may need to pick from "no PFS" or "same as phase 1 DH group") + guess how we should negotiate lifetime + (is "strict" a reasonable default?) + guess which mode to use for phase 1 negotiation (is main mode useful? + is base mode popular enough?) +o more acceptable check. + +SHOULD +o psk.txt should be a database? (psk.db?) psk_mkdb? +o Dynamically retry to exchange and resend the packet per nodes. +o To make the list of supported algorithm by sadb_supported payload + in the SADB_REGISTER message which happens asynchronously. +o fix the structure of ph2handle. + We can handle the below case. + + node A node B + +--------------SA1----------------+ + +--------------SA2----------------+ + + at node A: + kernel + acquire(A-B) ------> ph2handle(A=B) -----> ph1handle + | + policy + A=B + A=B + + But we can not handle the below case because there is no x?handle. + + node A node B node C + +--------------SA1----------------+ + +------------------------------------------------SA2---------------+ + + at node A: + kernel + acquire(A-C) ---+---> x?handle ---+---> ph2handle(A=B) -------> ph1handle + | | | + acquire(A-B) ---+ policy +---> ph2handle(A=C) -------> ph1handle + A=B + A=C + +o consistency of function name. +o deep copy configuration entry to hander. It's easy to reload configuration. +o don't keep to hold keymat values, do it ? +o local address's field in isakmpsa handler must be kicked out to rmconf. +o responder policy and initiator policy should be separated. +o for lifetime and key length, something like this should be useful. + - propose N + - accept between X and Y +o wildcard "accept any proposal" policy should be allowed. +o replay prevention + - limited total number of session + - limited session per peer + - number of proposal +o full support for variable length SPI. quickhack support for IPComp is done. + +MAY +o Effective code. +o interaction between IKE/IPsec and socket layer. + at this moment, IKE/IPsec failure is modeled as total packet loss to other + part of network subsystem, including socket layer. this presents the + following behaviors: + - annoyingly long timeouts on tcp connection attempt, and IKE failure; + need to wait till tcp socket timeouts. + - blackhole if there's mismatching SAs. + we may be able to give socket layer some feedback from IKE/IPsec layer. + still not sure if those make sense or not. + for example: + - send PRU_HOSTDEAD to sockets if IKE negotiation failed + (sys/netkey/key.c:key_acquire2) + to do this, we need to remember which ACQUIRE was caused by which socket, + possibly into larval SAs. + - PRU_QUENCH on "no SA found on output" + - kick tcp retransmission timer on first SA establishment +o IKE daemon should handle situations where peer does not run IKE daemon + (UDP port unreach for port 500) better. + should use connected UDP sockets for sending IKE datagrams. +o rate-limit log messages from kernel IPsec errors, like "no SA found". + +TO BE TESTED. +o IKE retransmit behavior + see, draft-*-ipsec-rekeying*.txt +o Reboot recovery (peer reboot losing it's security associations) + see, draft-*-ipsec-rekeying*.txt +o Scenarios + - End-to-End transport long lived security associations + (over night, data transfer >1Gb) with frequent dynamic rekey + - End-to-GW tunnel long lived security associations + (over night, data transfer >1Gb) with frequent dynamic rekey + - Policy change events while under SA load + - End-to-End SA through IPsec tunnels, initiation both ways + - Client End-to-End through client-to-GW tunnel SA, initiate from + client for tunnel, then initiation both ways for end-to-end + - Client-to-GW transport SA for secure management +o behavior to receive multiple auth method proposals and AND proposal + +and to be written many many. + |