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-rw-r--r--freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions.c12
-rw-r--r--freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c13
-rw-r--r--freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem.c5
-rw-r--r--freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c12
-rw-r--r--freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c59
-rw-r--r--freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_locl.h3
-rw-r--r--freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c44
7 files changed, 112 insertions, 36 deletions
diff --git a/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions.c b/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions.c
index a6491c3d..d75460f2 100644
--- a/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions.c
+++ b/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions.c
@@ -964,7 +964,7 @@ static int final_server_name(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent)
*/
if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && s->ctx != s->session_ctx) {
tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept);
- tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept);
+ tsan_decr(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept);
}
/*
@@ -1200,7 +1200,7 @@ static EXT_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
- const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
+ const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = get_ca_names(s);
if (ca_sk == NULL || sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
@@ -1213,7 +1213,7 @@ static EXT_RETURN tls_construct_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
- if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
+ if (!construct_ca_names(s, ca_sk, pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
}
@@ -1532,10 +1532,12 @@ int tls_psk_do_binder(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *msgstart,
*/
if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
size_t hdatalen;
+ long hdatalen_l;
void *hdata;
- hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
- if (hdatalen <= 0) {
+ hdatalen = hdatalen_l =
+ BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
+ if (hdatalen_l <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER,
SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
goto err;
diff --git a/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
index d58ae79b..a64d5367 100644
--- a/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+++ b/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
static int use_ecc(SSL *s)
{
- int i, end;
+ int i, end, ret = 0;
unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = NULL;
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static int use_ecc(SSL *s)
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
return 0;
- cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+ cipher_stack = SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(s);
end = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack);
for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
@@ -134,11 +134,14 @@ static int use_ecc(SSL *s)
alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
|| (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
- || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION)
- return 1;
+ || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ }
}
- return 0;
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_stack);
+ return ret;
}
EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
diff --git a/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem.c b/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem.c
index 32e87690..ad50677d 100644
--- a/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem.c
+++ b/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem.c
@@ -120,11 +120,12 @@ void ossl_statem_set_renegotiate(SSL *s)
void ossl_statem_fatal(SSL *s, int al, int func, int reason, const char *file,
int line)
{
+ ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_SSL, func, reason, file, line);
/* We shouldn't call SSLfatal() twice. Once is enough */
- assert(s->statem.state != MSG_FLOW_ERROR);
+ if (s->statem.in_init && s->statem.state == MSG_FLOW_ERROR)
+ return;
s->statem.in_init = 1;
s->statem.state = MSG_FLOW_ERROR;
- ERR_put_error(ERR_LIB_SSL, func, reason, file, line);
if (al != SSL_AD_NO_ALERT
&& s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID)
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
diff --git a/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c b/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
index 574ec01e..154a9d45 100644
--- a/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
+++ b/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c
@@ -1097,6 +1097,7 @@ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return WORK_ERROR;
+ case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
}
@@ -2565,6 +2566,17 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
+ /*
+ * In TLSv1.3 we don't prepare the client certificate yet. We wait until
+ * after the CertificateVerify message has been received. This is because
+ * in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest arrives before the Certificate message
+ * but in TLSv1.2 it is the other way around. We want to make sure that
+ * SSL_get_peer_certificate() returns something sensible in
+ * client_cert_cb.
+ */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED)
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
}
diff --git a/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c b/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
index 1ea719c7..e8c96f27 100644
--- a/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
+++ b/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
@@ -205,9 +205,10 @@ static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs,
*hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen;
} else {
size_t retlen;
+ long retlen_l;
- retlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
- if (retlen <= 0) {
+ retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata);
+ if (retlen_l <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
@@ -496,7 +497,18 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
}
}
- ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+ /*
+ * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client
+ * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the
+ * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest
+ * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We
+ * want to make sure that SSL_get_peer_certificate() will return the actual
+ * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback.
+ */
+ if (!s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1)
+ ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
+ else
+ ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
err:
BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
@@ -1497,6 +1509,10 @@ static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method)
static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s)
{
int i;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ int curve;
+ EC_KEY *eckey;
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL)
@@ -1517,8 +1533,25 @@ static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s)
default:
break;
}
- if (ssl_has_cert(s, i))
+ if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i))
+ continue;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC)
+ return 1;
+ /*
+ * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is
+ * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this
+ * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446.
+ */
+ eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
+ if (eckey == NULL)
+ continue;
+ curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey));
+ if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve))
return 1;
+#else
+ return 1;
+#endif
}
return 0;
@@ -2263,10 +2296,24 @@ int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
return 0;
}
-int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s)
{
- const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
+ const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;;
+
+ if (s->server) {
+ ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
+ if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0)
+ ca_sk = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (ca_sk == NULL)
+ ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s);
+ return ca_sk;
+}
+
+int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt)
+{
/* Start sub-packet for client CA list */
if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES,
diff --git a/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_locl.h b/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_locl.h
index 25e56e4e..6b8cf37f 100644
--- a/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_locl.h
+++ b/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_locl.h
@@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval,
size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr,
size_t hrrlen);
int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
-int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt);
+const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s);
+int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt);
size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs,
const void *param, size_t paramlen);
diff --git a/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c b/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
index f9c06aaf..c9bee6ba 100644
--- a/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
+++ b/freebsd/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
@@ -1521,8 +1521,10 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
* So check cookie length...
*/
if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
- if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0)
+ if (clienthello->dtls_cookie_len == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(clienthello);
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
+ }
}
}
@@ -2058,10 +2060,6 @@ static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
#else
s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
#endif
- if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- goto err;
- }
}
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
@@ -2229,19 +2227,25 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
- if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
- int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
- if (rv == 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
- SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ if (s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
+ int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
+ if (rv == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (rv < 0) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ return WORK_MORE_B;
+ }
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
- if (rv < 0) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- return WORK_MORE_B;
+ if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
+ /* SSLfatal already called */
+ goto err;
}
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
/* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
@@ -2878,7 +2882,7 @@ int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
}
}
- if (!construct_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
+ if (!construct_ca_names(s, get_ca_names(s), pkt)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return 0;
}
@@ -3224,6 +3228,12 @@ static int tls_process_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
+ if (skey == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
ckey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CKE_ECDHE,