diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'freebsd/crypto/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | freebsd/crypto/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h | 46 |
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 20 deletions
diff --git a/freebsd/crypto/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h b/freebsd/crypto/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h index c3e9804d..306c59f6 100644 --- a/freebsd/crypto/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h +++ b/freebsd/crypto/openssl/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ # define DRBG_MAX_LENGTH INT32_MAX - /* * Maximum allocation size for RANDOM_POOL buffers * @@ -72,6 +71,24 @@ * 1.5 * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8)) */ +/* + * Initial allocation minimum. + * + * There is a distinction between the secure and normal allocation minimums. + * Ideally, the secure allocation size should be a power of two. The normal + * allocation size doesn't have any such restriction. + * + * The secure value is based on 128 bits of secure material, which is 16 bytes. + * Typically, the DRBGs will set a minimum larger than this so optimal + * allocation ought to take place (for full quality seed material). + * + * The normal value has been chosed by noticing that the rand_drbg_get_nonce + * function is usually the largest of the built in allocation (twenty four + * bytes and then appending another sixteen bytes). This means the buffer ends + * with 40 bytes. The value of forty eight is comfortably above this which + * allows some slack in the platform specific values used. + */ +# define RAND_POOL_MIN_ALLOCATION(secure) ((secure) ? 16 : 48) /* DRBG status values */ typedef enum drbg_status_e { @@ -150,9 +167,11 @@ struct rand_pool_st { size_t len; /* current number of random bytes contained in the pool */ int attached; /* true pool was attached to existing buffer */ + int secure; /* 1: allocated on the secure heap, 0: otherwise */ size_t min_len; /* minimum number of random bytes requested */ size_t max_len; /* maximum number of random bytes (allocated buffer size) */ + size_t alloc_len; /* current number of bytes allocated */ size_t entropy; /* current entropy count in bits */ size_t entropy_requested; /* requested entropy count in bits */ }; @@ -167,12 +186,12 @@ struct rand_drbg_st { int secure; /* 1: allocated on the secure heap, 0: otherwise */ int type; /* the nid of the underlying algorithm */ /* - * Stores the value of the rand_fork_count global as of when we last - * reseeded. The DRBG reseeds automatically whenever drbg->fork_count != - * rand_fork_count. Used to provide fork-safety and reseed this DRBG in - * the child process. + * Stores the return value of openssl_get_fork_id() as of when we last + * reseeded. The DRBG reseeds automatically whenever drbg->fork_id != + * openssl_get_fork_id(). Used to provide fork-safety and reseed this + * DRBG in the child process. */ - int fork_count; + int fork_id; unsigned short flags; /* various external flags */ /* @@ -264,19 +283,6 @@ struct rand_drbg_st { /* The global RAND method, and the global buffer and DRBG instance. */ extern RAND_METHOD rand_meth; -/* - * A "generation count" of forks. Incremented in the child process after a - * fork. Since rand_fork_count is increment-only, and only ever written to in - * the child process of the fork, which is guaranteed to be single-threaded, no - * locking is needed for normal (read) accesses; the rest of pthread fork - * processing is assumed to introduce the necessary memory barriers. Sibling - * children of a given parent will produce duplicate values, but this is not - * problematic because the reseeding process pulls input from the system CSPRNG - * and/or other global sources, so the siblings will end up generating - * different output streams. - */ -extern int rand_fork_count; - /* DRBG helpers */ int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg, const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy); |