#include <machine/rtems-bsd-user-space.h>
/* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
int i;
X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
ai = a->cert_info;
bi = b->cert_info;
i = M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber);
if (i)
return (i);
return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
{
unsigned long ret = 0;
EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
unsigned char md[16];
char *f;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0);
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
goto err;
OPENSSL_free(f);
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
(&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
(unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
goto err;
ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
) & 0xffffffffL;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return (ret);
}
#endif
int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer));
}
int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject));
}
int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
{
return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer));
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
{
return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
}
#endif
X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
{
return (a->cert_info->issuer);
}
unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
{
return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
{
return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
}
#endif
X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
{
return (a->cert_info->subject);
}
ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
{
return (a->cert_info->serialNumber);
}
unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
{
return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
{
return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
/*
* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
* Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
* arguments (eg. for use in STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these
* operations may involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
* certain cert information is cached. So this is the point where the
* "depth-first" constification tree has to halt with an evil cast.
*/
int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
int rv;
/* ensure hash is valid */
X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
if (rv)
return rv;
/* Check for match against stored encoding too */
if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) {
rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len);
if (rv)
return rv;
return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc,
a->cert_info->enc.len);
}
return rv;
}
#endif
int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
{
int ret;
/* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
return -2;
}
if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
if (ret < 0)
return -2;
}
ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
if (ret != 0 || a->canon_enclen == 0)
return ret;
return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
}
unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
{
unsigned long ret = 0;
unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
/* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
NULL))
return 0;
ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
) & 0xffffffffL;
return (ret);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
/*
* I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding,
* this is reasonably efficient.
*/
unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
{
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
unsigned long ret = 0;
unsigned char md[16];
/* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
&& EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
&& EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL))
ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
) & 0xffffffffL;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return (ret);
}
#endif
/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
{
int i;
X509_CINF cinf;
X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
if (!sk)
return NULL;
x.cert_info = &cinf;
cinf.serialNumber = serial;
cinf.issuer = name;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
return (x509);
}
return (NULL);
}
X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
{
X509 *x509;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
return (x509);
}
return (NULL);
}
EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
{
if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
return (NULL);
return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
}
ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
{
if (!x)
return NULL;
return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
}
int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
{
EVP_PKEY *xk;
int ret;
xk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
if (xk)
ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
else
ret = -2;
switch (ret) {
case 1:
break;
case 0:
X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
break;
case -1:
X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
break;
case -2:
X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
}
if (xk)
EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
if (ret > 0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
/*
* Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
* of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
* flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
{
const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
int curve_nid;
if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec);
if (!grp)
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
/* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
/*
* Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
*/
if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
/* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
*pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
} else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
} else
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
return X509_V_OK;
}
int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
unsigned long flags)
{
int rv, i, sign_nid;
EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
unsigned long tflags;
if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
return X509_V_OK;
tflags = flags;
/* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
if (x == NULL) {
x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
i = 1;
} else
i = 0;
if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
/* Correct error depth */
i = 0;
goto end;
}
pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
/* Check EE key only */
rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
/* Correct error depth */
i = 0;
goto end;
}
for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
goto end;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
if (rv != X509_V_OK)
goto end;
}
/* Final check: root CA signature */
rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
end:
if (pk)
EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
/* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
|| rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
i--;
/*
* If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
* with P-256. Use more meaninggul error.
*/
if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
if (perror_depth)
*perror_depth = i;
}
return rv;
}
int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
{
int sign_nid;
if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
return X509_V_OK;
sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm);
return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
}
#else
int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
unsigned long flags)
{
return 0;
}
int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
{
return 0;
}
#endif
/*
* Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
* count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
* each X509 structure.
*/
STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
int i;
ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
}
return ret;
}
