diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'cpukit/librpc/src/rpc/svc_auth_des.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | cpukit/librpc/src/rpc/svc_auth_des.c | 531 |
1 files changed, 531 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/cpukit/librpc/src/rpc/svc_auth_des.c b/cpukit/librpc/src/rpc/svc_auth_des.c index e69de29bb2..a107168e30 100644 --- a/cpukit/librpc/src/rpc/svc_auth_des.c +++ b/cpukit/librpc/src/rpc/svc_auth_des.c @@ -0,0 +1,531 @@ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 1988 by Sun Microsystems, Inc. + */ + +/* + * Sun RPC is a product of Sun Microsystems, Inc. and is provided for + * unrestricted use provided that this legend is included on all tape + * media and as a part of the software program in whole or part. Users + * may copy or modify Sun RPC without charge, but are not authorized + * to license or distribute it to anyone else except as part of a product or + * program developed by the user. + * + * SUN RPC IS PROVIDED AS IS WITH NO WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND INCLUDING THE + * WARRANTIES OF DESIGN, MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR + * PURPOSE, OR ARISING FROM A COURSE OF DEALING, USAGE OR TRADE PRACTICE. + * + * Sun RPC is provided with no support and without any obligation on the + * part of Sun Microsystems, Inc. to assist in its use, correction, + * modification or enhancement. + * + * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC. SHALL HAVE NO LIABILITY WITH RESPECT TO THE + * INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHTS, TRADE SECRETS OR ANY PATENTS BY SUN RPC + * OR ANY PART THEREOF. + * + * In no event will Sun Microsystems, Inc. be liable for any lost revenue + * or profits or other special, indirect and consequential damages, even if + * Sun has been advised of the possibility of such damages. + * + * Sun Microsystems, Inc. + * 2550 Garcia Avenue + * Mountain View, California 94043 + */ + +/* + * svcauth_des.c, server-side des authentication + * + * We insure for the service the following: + * (1) The timestamp microseconds do not exceed 1 million. + * (2) The timestamp plus the window is less than the current time. + * (3) The timestamp is not less than the one previously + * seen in the current session. + * + * It is up to the server to determine if the window size is + * too small . + * + */ + +#include <string.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <rpc/des_crypt.h> +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <netinet/in.h> +#include <rpc/types.h> +#include <rpc/xdr.h> +#include <rpc/auth.h> +#include <rpc/auth_des.h> +#include <rpc/svc.h> +#include <rpc/rpc_msg.h> +#include <rpc/svc_auth.h> + +#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) +/* from: static char sccsid[] = "@(#)svcauth_des.c 2.3 89/07/11 4.0 RPCSRC; from 1.15 88/02/08 SMI"; */ +static const char rcsid[] = "$FreeBSD: src/lib/libc/rpc/svc_auth_des.c,v 1.3 1999/08/28 00:00:48 peter Exp $"; +#endif + +#define debug(msg) printf("svcauth_des: %s\n", msg) + +#define USEC_PER_SEC ((u_long) 1000000L) +#define BEFORE(t1, t2) timercmp(t1, t2, <) + +/* + * LRU cache of conversation keys and some other useful items. + */ +#define AUTHDES_CACHESZ 64 +struct cache_entry { + des_block key; /* conversation key */ + char *rname; /* client's name */ + u_int window; /* credential lifetime window */ + struct timeval laststamp; /* detect replays of creds */ + char *localcred; /* generic local credential */ +}; +static struct cache_entry *authdes_cache/* [AUTHDES_CACHESZ] */; +static short *authdes_lru/* [AUTHDES_CACHESZ] */; + +static void cache_init(); /* initialize the cache */ +static short cache_spot(); /* find an entry in the cache */ +static void cache_ref(/*short sid*/); /* note that sid was ref'd */ + +static void invalidate(); /* invalidate entry in cache */ + +/* + * cache statistics + */ +static struct { + u_long ncachehits; /* times cache hit, and is not replay */ + u_long ncachereplays; /* times cache hit, and is replay */ + u_long ncachemisses; /* times cache missed */ +} svcauthdes_stats; + +/* + * Service side authenticator for AUTH_DES + */ +enum auth_stat +_svcauth_des(rqst, msg) + register struct svc_req *rqst; + register struct rpc_msg *msg; +{ + + register long *ixdr; + des_block cryptbuf[2]; + register struct authdes_cred *cred; + struct authdes_verf verf; + int status; + register struct cache_entry *entry; + short sid = 0; + des_block *sessionkey; + des_block ivec; + u_int window; + struct timeval timestamp; + u_long namelen; + struct area { + struct authdes_cred area_cred; + char area_netname[MAXNETNAMELEN+1]; + } *area; + + if (authdes_cache == NULL) { + cache_init(); + } + + area = (struct area *)rqst->rq_clntcred; + cred = (struct authdes_cred *)&area->area_cred; + + /* + * Get the credential + */ + ixdr = (long *)msg->rm_call.cb_cred.oa_base; + cred->adc_namekind = IXDR_GET_ENUM(ixdr, enum authdes_namekind); + switch (cred->adc_namekind) { + case ADN_FULLNAME: + namelen = IXDR_GET_U_LONG(ixdr); + if (namelen > MAXNETNAMELEN) { + return (AUTH_BADCRED); + } + cred->adc_fullname.name = area->area_netname; + bcopy((char *)ixdr, cred->adc_fullname.name, + (u_int)namelen); + cred->adc_fullname.name[namelen] = 0; + ixdr += (RNDUP(namelen) / BYTES_PER_XDR_UNIT); + cred->adc_fullname.key.key.high = (u_long)*ixdr++; + cred->adc_fullname.key.key.low = (u_long)*ixdr++; + cred->adc_fullname.window = (u_long)*ixdr++; + break; + case ADN_NICKNAME: + cred->adc_nickname = (u_long)*ixdr++; + break; + default: + return (AUTH_BADCRED); + } + + /* + * Get the verifier + */ + ixdr = (long *)msg->rm_call.cb_verf.oa_base; + verf.adv_xtimestamp.key.high = (u_long)*ixdr++; + verf.adv_xtimestamp.key.low = (u_long)*ixdr++; + verf.adv_int_u = (u_long)*ixdr++; + + + /* + * Get the conversation key + */ + if (cred->adc_namekind == ADN_FULLNAME) { + netobj pkey; + char pkey_data[1024]; + + sessionkey = &cred->adc_fullname.key; + if (! getpublickey(cred->adc_fullname.name, pkey_data)) { + debug("getpublickey"); + return(AUTH_BADCRED); + } + pkey.n_bytes = pkey_data; + pkey.n_len = strlen(pkey_data) + 1; + if (key_decryptsession_pk(cred->adc_fullname.name, &pkey, + sessionkey) < 0) { + debug("decryptsessionkey"); + return (AUTH_BADCRED); /* key not found */ + } + } else { /* ADN_NICKNAME */ + sid = (short)cred->adc_nickname; + if (sid >= AUTHDES_CACHESZ) { + debug("bad nickname"); + return (AUTH_BADCRED); /* garbled credential */ + } + sessionkey = &authdes_cache[sid].key; + } + + + /* + * Decrypt the timestamp + */ + cryptbuf[0] = verf.adv_xtimestamp; + if (cred->adc_namekind == ADN_FULLNAME) { + cryptbuf[1].key.high = cred->adc_fullname.window; + cryptbuf[1].key.low = verf.adv_winverf; + ivec.key.high = ivec.key.low = 0; + status = cbc_crypt((char *)sessionkey, (char *)cryptbuf, + 2*sizeof(des_block), DES_DECRYPT | DES_HW, + (char *)&ivec); + } else { + status = ecb_crypt((char *)sessionkey, (char *)cryptbuf, + sizeof(des_block), DES_DECRYPT | DES_HW); + } + if (DES_FAILED(status)) { + debug("decryption failure"); + return (AUTH_FAILED); /* system error */ + } + + /* + * XDR the decrypted timestamp + */ + ixdr = (long *)cryptbuf; + timestamp.tv_sec = IXDR_GET_LONG(ixdr); + timestamp.tv_usec = IXDR_GET_LONG(ixdr); + + /* + * Check for valid credentials and verifiers. + * They could be invalid because the key was flushed + * out of the cache, and so a new session should begin. + * Be sure and send AUTH_REJECTED{CRED, VERF} if this is the case. + */ + { + struct timeval current; + int nick; + int winverf; + + if (cred->adc_namekind == ADN_FULLNAME) { + window = IXDR_GET_U_LONG(ixdr); + winverf = IXDR_GET_U_LONG(ixdr); + if (winverf != window - 1) { + debug("window verifier mismatch"); + return (AUTH_BADCRED); /* garbled credential */ + } + sid = cache_spot(sessionkey, cred->adc_fullname.name, + ×tamp); + if (sid < 0) { + debug("replayed credential"); + return (AUTH_REJECTEDCRED); /* replay */ + } + nick = 0; + } else { /* ADN_NICKNAME */ + window = authdes_cache[sid].window; + nick = 1; + } + + if ((u_long)timestamp.tv_usec >= USEC_PER_SEC) { + debug("invalid usecs"); + /* cached out (bad key), or garbled verifier */ + return (nick ? AUTH_REJECTEDVERF : AUTH_BADVERF); + } + if (nick && BEFORE(×tamp, + &authdes_cache[sid].laststamp)) { + debug("timestamp before last seen"); + return (AUTH_REJECTEDVERF); /* replay */ + } + (void) gettimeofday(¤t, (struct timezone *)NULL); + current.tv_sec -= window; /* allow for expiration */ + if (!BEFORE(¤t, ×tamp)) { + debug("timestamp expired"); + /* replay, or garbled credential */ + return (nick ? AUTH_REJECTEDVERF : AUTH_BADCRED); + } + } + + /* + * Set up the reply verifier + */ + verf.adv_nickname = (u_long)sid; + + /* + * xdr the timestamp before encrypting + */ + ixdr = (long *)cryptbuf; + IXDR_PUT_LONG(ixdr, timestamp.tv_sec - 1); + IXDR_PUT_LONG(ixdr, timestamp.tv_usec); + + /* + * encrypt the timestamp + */ + status = ecb_crypt((char *)sessionkey, (char *)cryptbuf, + sizeof(des_block), DES_ENCRYPT | DES_HW); + if (DES_FAILED(status)) { + debug("encryption failure"); + return (AUTH_FAILED); /* system error */ + } + verf.adv_xtimestamp = cryptbuf[0]; + + /* + * Serialize the reply verifier, and update rqst + */ + ixdr = (long *)msg->rm_call.cb_verf.oa_base; + *ixdr++ = (long)verf.adv_xtimestamp.key.high; + *ixdr++ = (long)verf.adv_xtimestamp.key.low; + *ixdr++ = (long)verf.adv_int_u; + + rqst->rq_xprt->xp_verf.oa_flavor = AUTH_DES; + rqst->rq_xprt->xp_verf.oa_base = msg->rm_call.cb_verf.oa_base; + rqst->rq_xprt->xp_verf.oa_length = + (char *)ixdr - msg->rm_call.cb_verf.oa_base; + + /* + * We succeeded, commit the data to the cache now and + * finish cooking the credential. + */ + entry = &authdes_cache[sid]; + entry->laststamp = timestamp; + cache_ref(sid); + if (cred->adc_namekind == ADN_FULLNAME) { + cred->adc_fullname.window = window; + cred->adc_nickname = (u_long)sid; /* save nickname */ + if (entry->rname != NULL) { + mem_free(entry->rname, strlen(entry->rname) + 1); + } + entry->rname = (char *)mem_alloc((u_int)strlen(cred->adc_fullname.name) + + 1); + if (entry->rname != NULL) { + (void) strcpy(entry->rname, cred->adc_fullname.name); + } else { + debug("out of memory"); + } + entry->key = *sessionkey; + entry->window = window; + invalidate(entry->localcred); /* mark any cached cred invalid */ + } else { /* ADN_NICKNAME */ + /* + * nicknames are cooked into fullnames + */ + cred->adc_namekind = ADN_FULLNAME; + cred->adc_fullname.name = entry->rname; + cred->adc_fullname.key = entry->key; + cred->adc_fullname.window = entry->window; + } + return (AUTH_OK); /* we made it!*/ +} + + +/* + * Initialize the cache + */ +static void +cache_init() +{ + register int i; + + authdes_cache = (struct cache_entry *) + mem_alloc(sizeof(struct cache_entry) * AUTHDES_CACHESZ); + bzero((char *)authdes_cache, + sizeof(struct cache_entry) * AUTHDES_CACHESZ); + + authdes_lru = (short *)mem_alloc(sizeof(short) * AUTHDES_CACHESZ); + /* + * Initialize the lru list + */ + for (i = 0; i < AUTHDES_CACHESZ; i++) { + authdes_lru[i] = i; + } +} + + +/* + * Find the lru victim + */ +static short +cache_victim() +{ + return (authdes_lru[AUTHDES_CACHESZ-1]); +} + +/* + * Note that sid was referenced + */ +static void +cache_ref(sid) + register short sid; +{ + register int i; + register short curr; + register short prev; + + prev = authdes_lru[0]; + authdes_lru[0] = sid; + for (i = 1; prev != sid; i++) { + curr = authdes_lru[i]; + authdes_lru[i] = prev; + prev = curr; + } +} + + +/* + * Find a spot in the cache for a credential containing + * the items given. Return -1 if a replay is detected, otherwise + * return the spot in the cache. + */ +static short +cache_spot(key, name, timestamp) + register des_block *key; + char *name; + struct timeval *timestamp; +{ + register struct cache_entry *cp; + register int i; + register u_long hi; + + hi = key->key.high; + for (cp = authdes_cache, i = 0; i < AUTHDES_CACHESZ; i++, cp++) { + if (cp->key.key.high == hi && + cp->key.key.low == key->key.low && + cp->rname != NULL && + bcmp(cp->rname, name, strlen(name) + 1) == 0) { + if (BEFORE(timestamp, &cp->laststamp)) { + svcauthdes_stats.ncachereplays++; + return (-1); /* replay */ + } + svcauthdes_stats.ncachehits++; + return (i); /* refresh */ + } + } + svcauthdes_stats.ncachemisses++; + return (cache_victim()); /* new credential */ +} + + +#if (defined(sun) || defined(vax) || defined(__FreeBSD__)) +/* + * Local credential handling stuff. + * NOTE: bsd unix dependent. + * Other operating systems should put something else here. + */ +#define UNKNOWN -2 /* grouplen, if cached cred is unknown user */ +#define INVALID -1 /* grouplen, if cache entry is invalid */ + +struct bsdcred { + short uid; /* cached uid */ + short gid; /* cached gid */ + short grouplen; /* length of cached groups */ + short groups[NGROUPS]; /* cached groups */ +}; + +/* + * Map a des credential into a unix cred. + * We cache the credential here so the application does + * not have to make an rpc call every time to interpret + * the credential. + */ +int +authdes_getucred(adc, uid, gid, grouplen, groups) + struct authdes_cred *adc; + uid_t *uid; + gid_t *gid; + int *grouplen; + register gid_t *groups; +{ + unsigned sid; + register int i; + uid_t i_uid; + gid_t i_gid; + int i_grouplen; + struct bsdcred *cred; + + sid = adc->adc_nickname; + if (sid >= AUTHDES_CACHESZ) { + debug("invalid nickname"); + return (0); + } + cred = (struct bsdcred *)authdes_cache[sid].localcred; + if (cred == NULL) { + cred = (struct bsdcred *)mem_alloc(sizeof(struct bsdcred)); + authdes_cache[sid].localcred = (char *)cred; + cred->grouplen = INVALID; + } + if (cred->grouplen == INVALID) { + /* + * not in cache: lookup + */ + if (!netname2user(adc->adc_fullname.name, &i_uid, &i_gid, + &i_grouplen, groups)) + { + debug("unknown netname"); + cred->grouplen = UNKNOWN; /* mark as lookup up, but not found */ + return (0); + } + debug("missed ucred cache"); + *uid = cred->uid = i_uid; + *gid = cred->gid = i_gid; + *grouplen = cred->grouplen = i_grouplen; + for (i = i_grouplen - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + cred->groups[i] = groups[i]; /* int to short */ + } + return (1); + } else if (cred->grouplen == UNKNOWN) { + /* + * Already lookup up, but no match found + */ + return (0); + } + + /* + * cached credentials + */ + *uid = cred->uid; + *gid = cred->gid; + *grouplen = cred->grouplen; + for (i = cred->grouplen - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + groups[i] = cred->groups[i]; /* short to int */ + } + return (1); +} + +static void +invalidate(cred) + char *cred; +{ + if (cred == NULL) { + return; + } + ((struct bsdcred *)cred)->grouplen = INVALID; +} +#endif + |